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found  that, when tighter mitigation measures are introduced by the larger country and unit 
transport cost is high, with a pronounced market asymmetry the probability of firms not 
relocating abroad is high even in the long-term. The welfare implications of unilateral 
environmental measures are assessed considering global industrial pollution and  accounting 
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Abstract:   
 
 
This paper analyses the impact of unilateral climate policy on firms’ international location 
strategies in emission-intensive sectors, when countries differ in terms of market size. The cases 
of partial and total relocation via foreign direct investment are separately considered. A simple 
international duopoly model highlights the differences between short-term and long-term 
effects. In the short-term no change in location is a likely outcome in very capital-intensive 
sectors, and when there is a strategy shift this takes the form of  partial instead of total 
relocation. In the long-run total relocation becomes a feasible outcome. However we found  
that, when tighter mitigation measures are introduced by the larger country and unit transport 
cost is high, with a pronounced market asymmetry the probability of firms not relocating abroad 
is high even in the long-term. The welfare implications of unilateral environmental measures are 
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1.  Introduction 
The potential impact of unilateral climate policy on national firms’ 
competitiveness and international location decisions is a key political issue both in the 
EU and the US.  The main concern is that unilateral measures may lead national firms in 
carbon-intensive sectors to relocate production (and emissions) to countries not taking 
comparable actions, leading to considerable job losses and to a high degree of carbon 
leakage. 
1. 
 According to Reinaud (2008), there is carbon leakage if a policy aimed to limit 
emissions in a region is the direct cause of an increase in emissions outside the region 
itself.
2 This problem combines two related sensitive issues: the environmental 
effectiveness of mitigation policy (i.e. the emission leakage) and the impact on 
competitiveness and job losses (i.e. the job leakage). Official documents emphasize the 
first aspect,
 while in the political debate the attention shifts towards the second issue.
  
Carbon leakage may take place via two competitiveness-driven channels: via changes in 
trade flows, and via foreign direct investment (FDI), that is through production 
relocation to countries not taking comparable mitigation actions.
3  The FDI channel is a 
critical mechanism, as it leads to major discontinuous changes, with a high degree of  
irreversibility, in both emissions and production (and thus employment).  That is why in 
the policy discussion most attention is given to what may be called as “relocation-driven 
carbon leakage”,  which implies considerable job losses.   
The carbon leakage debate has been undergoing for sometime in the EU due to 
the unilateral adoption of the cap-and-trade scheme, denominated  EU Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS).
4 These measures have created a more stringent environmental 
regime in the EU as compared to other geographical areas, and thus may have important 
repercussions on the competitiveness of European firms, particularly in energy-
                                                 
1Here we are dealing with pollution related to production. Measures aiming to reduce emissions related to 
consumption (such as in transport) do not affect firms’ location choices.  
2  IPCC (2007) defines the carbon leakage rate as  “the increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries 
taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries” (see IPCC, 
2007, Technical Summary, p. 81). 
3Reinaud (2008, p. 3) indicates that there is also a third channel (the fossil fuel price channel), but focuses 
on the two competitiveness-driven channel, as they can be more realistically addressed via national 
policies. Similarly, Neuhoff  (2008)  focuses on the two competitiveness-driven channel as they are at the 
centre of policy discussions. 
4 The EU Emission Trading Scheme started with a pilot phase from 2005 to 2007, followed by a second 
trading period (2008-2012). The current debate concerns the new rules  on the EU ETS third trading 
period (2013-2020). See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/implementation_en.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm 
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intensive industries (Mc Kinsey, 2006;  Bergmann et al., 2007; World Bank, 2008; 
OECD, 2009).  A similar discussion is currently taking place in the US, where the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES) was approved in June 2009 by the 
House of Representatives,
5 and is now under examination by the Senate.
6 The fear of 
adverse impacts of environmental policies is heightened by the claims of energy-
intensive industries across the Atlantic. EU  producers  have warned insistently that a 
tightened ETS will force them to move factories and jobs beyond the EU border, asking 
thus for compensatory measures.
7  Similar  claims were advanced by US producers.
8  
The question to assess is whether these fears are overrated or not.
 9 
A related, although less policy-oriented, debate has been going on in the trade 
and environment literature concerning whether globalization will lead to the emergence 
of the so-called “pollution havens”. The pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) predicts that, 
due to the liberalisation of trade and FDI, firms active in pollution-intensive sectors and 
operating in countries adopting more restrictive environmental policies,  will transfer 
production abroad and will serve the domestic markets from these new foreign plants 
(see e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 1994, 2003). As environmental policy becomes more 
restrictive with economic growth (being the environment a normal good), it is expected 
that in highly-polluting sectors production will move from developed to developing 
countries. However, while theoretical works converge in predicting such a shift, 
empirical research has not supported this prediction. In fact we may talk of a “pollution 
haven” paradox.
10 
The formal literature has generally overlooked the role of FDI, when addressing 
the carbon leakage and the pollution haven issues, notwithstanding that both phenomena 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
5 HR 2454, called also the Waxman-Markey bill. 
6 Kerry-Lieberman Bill. 
7The Boston Consulting Group report commissioned  by the European Cement Association 
(CEMBUREAU) (Boston Consulting Group, 2008) concludes that  (p. 25) “The full auctioning of  CO2  
allowances in 2020 would lead to offshoring of more that 80% of clinker production at a CO2 price of  € 
25/t, while at CO2 price of € 35/t, the entire EU clinker production will be at risk of carbon leakage”.  
8 The American Chemistry Council in June 2009 stresses that “unilateral climate change policy has the 
potential to drive manufacturing production, jobs and greenhouse gas emission to overseas markets……” 
thus supporting the proposal for rebates and border adjustments. See:  
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/bin.asp?CID=206&DID=9728&DOC=FILE.PDF 
9 Analyses on the impact of EU ETS on the competitiveness of energy intensive and trade exposed 
industries have not found empirical evidence of a correlation between EU carbon prices and a loss of 
competitiveness. See Convery et al. (2008) and Reinaud (2008). 
10 On the “pollution haven paradox” see: Ederington et al. (2005), Eskeland and Harrison (2003), 
Levinson and Taylor (2008), Smarzynska and Wei (2004), Spatareanu (2007) and Wagner and Timmins 
(2009).   4
are inherently linked with the effect of environmental measures on firms’ choice of 
international location. Thus most studies on the PHH analyze the interaction of trade 
and environment (Fullerton, 2006) without taking into account the issue of firms’ 
geographical mobility, although FDI represents an essential part of the PHH reasoning, 
as acknowledged by Taylor (2006)
11.  Similarly, most CGE models analyze the 
likelihood of carbon leakage accounting only for effects via trade.  
Furthermore, partial equilibrium models addressing FDI and environmental 
policy do not consider crucial aspects of the problem, loosing much of their interest for 
empirical work or policy decisions. Early models (Markusen et al., 1993);  Motta and 
Thisse, 1994), endogenizing the location decision but not environmental policy, 
accounted for most key location factors.  These studies  however were concerned with 
symmetric countries  and  considered local pollution.
12 During the last ten years, the 
main focus has shifted towards endogenizing environmental policy in a strategic 
context, while often taking the international strategy of firms as exogenous (e.g. 
Bayindir-Upmann, 2003;  Kayalica and Lahiri, 2005; Cole et al , 2006).  Only in a few 
papers both governments and firms decisions have been treated as endogenous 
(Markusen,  et al , 1995;  Rauscher, 1995; Hoel, 1997; Ulph and Valentini, 2001; Abe 
and Zhao, 2005; Ikefuji et al., 2010).   
This strand of literature, in order to address both location and policy decisions, 
introduces drastic simplifications, assuming for instance that there are no transport 
costs, the two areas (adopting mitigation policy and not) have the same size, firms face 
the same plant fixed costs when producing at home or abroad,
13 and pollution is local.  
Due to the combination of fixed plant costs with zero transport costs, in these analyses 
each firm operates only one plant; in the absence of fixed relocation costs this plant will 
always  be located in the country with the lowest tax rates (Hoel, 1997). As a result of 
this very stylized setup, these models have three major shortcomings. They are unable 
to capture the different forms that relocation may assume and their specific welfare 
                                                 
11 Taylor (2006), p. 5 underlines that there are two quite different concepts: the “pollution haven effect” 
(if more stringent environmental regulations lead only to changes in trade flows) and the “Pollution 
Haven Hypothesis” (which predicts that in pollution-intensive industries firms will relocate production).   
12 In addition Markusen et al. (1993) ruled out by assumption the total relocation outcome which is at the 
centre of the present debate. Motta and Thisse (1994) only briefly  considered market size asymmetry,  as 
discussed in section 3. 
13 Ikefuji et al. (2010) allow for fixed relocation costs. However their model, with two domestic producers 
and no foreign competition, considers local pollution, zero transport costs  (and thus one plant per firm) 
and  sales in the foreign market are assumed away. 
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implications. In addition, by assuming symmetric markets, they tend to overrate the 
probability that total relocation will occur, offering theoretical support to companies’ 
claims  of a high risk of relocation-driven carbon leakage. Furthermore, they do not 
recognize that an essential aspect of the carbon leakage debate is the global (instead of 
local) nature of the negative environmental externality, and thus the effectiveness of 
environmental policy depends on global and not on domestic production.  
In this paper we try to fill these gaps by presenting a simple two-stage 
international duopoly model on the impact of unilateral climate policy on firms’ 
international location strategy and welfare, which allows for market size asymmetry 
between the two areas (with and without mitigation policies), transport costs, plant- 
specific fixed costs and considers global industrial pollution.  As to plant fixed costs, we 
analyze both the case in which the existing capital stock has reached its economic end 
of life and that in which is still operating. The model thus captures the main centripetal 
and centrifugal forces driving the location decision when firms are confronted by 
unilateral climate measures (considered here as exogenous). Moreover it  can tackle 
different types of relocation as firms may control more than one plant,  showing that the 
welfare impact of unilateral climate measures are specific to the form undertaken by 
relocation.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the stylized facts on 
which to build a model. Section 3 presents the model, while Section 4 analyzes how  the 
interaction between FDI and environmental policy is influenced by market size and 
plant costs asymmetries. Regions representing equilibrium outcomes are dealt with in 
Section 5 while Section 6 presents some welfare results. Section 7 briefly discusses 
carbon leakage provisions in EU and US climate policy and  Section 8 draws the main 
conclusions.  
 
2. Stylized facts and neglected location factors 
As the effects of environmental measures on plant location are highly context-
dependent, it is important to identify the main features of pollution-intensive sectors in 
order to define key stylised and empirically grounded facts on which to build a model.  
The impact of industries on the environment may be measured by different 
indicators. Mani and Wheeler (1997) show that, if the level of abatement expenditure 
per unit of output is considered, five sectors emerge as “dirty industries”: Iron and Steel,   6
Non-Ferrous Metals (such as aluminium), Industrial Chemicals, Pulp and Paper, and 
Non-  Metallic Mineral Products (such as cement).  
These sectors have some common features. Mani and Wheeler (1997) find that 
dirty industries are relatively intensive in capital, energy and land. The importance of 
capital intensity (and thus of fixed plant costs) in these sectors is underlined in several 
other studies (e.g. McKinsey & Company, 2006;  Cole and Elliot, 2005; Bergmann et 
al., 2007). Furthermore,  firms in these sectors produce bulk commodities with a high 
weight/value ratio and are thus characterized by large transportation costs (see 
Anderson and Wincoop, 2004; Hummels, 2007). 
Let us consider as an illustration the case of cement production. This is a key 
industry, both from an economic and an environmental perspective. Cement is an 
essential input for the construction industry (highways, residential and commercial 
buildings, tunnels and dams) and cement plants account for 5% of global emissions of 
carbon dioxide (C02), the main cause of global warming. This industry is very energy-
intensive
14 and is included in the EU ETS. It is characterized by large capital start-up 
costs calculated by McKinsey (2006) to amount to 120 million Euro for a 1 million ton 
plant.
15 Furthermore the average operating time of a plant is estimated to be 30 years.
16 
Cement production is also characterized by high transport costs as compared to unit 
value. Transport costs from Northern Africa or the Eastern European countries outside 
the EU to Antwerp have been estimated to reach 36% of unit variable production 
costs
17; then markets are served largely via local production. In 2006 trade of cement 
and clinker (the primary input to cement) represented only 7% of world cement 
consumption. 
18  
We argue therefore that fixed plant costs, transport costs and market size 
asymmetry are essential components of a model analyzing firms’ responses to unilateral 
climate actions.  
                                                 
14 Energy costs may represent 30-40% of production costs (Cembureau, Competitiveness of European 
cement industry, www.cembureau.be). 
15 In this capital intensive industry five large multinationals  (Holcim, Lafarge, Cemex, 
HeidelbergCement, Italcementi) control around 58% in the EU25 market and 30%  of the global cement 
market. See The Global Cement Report (7th edition), www.CemNet.com. 
16 Boston Consulting Group (2008), p.12.  OECD/IEA (2009), p. 54, reports that in general, significant 
modernisation investments need to be undertaken every 25-40 years for an aluminium smelter, 20-25 
years for a blast furnace still mill, 25-30 years for a steel rolling mill, and 20 for  cement kilns.  However, 
the life span of these installations can reach up to 50 years.   
17 McKinsey (2006), p. 37; Bergmann et al. (2007), p.24.   
18 See The Global Cement Report (7th edition), www.CemNet.com. However the trade intensity varies 
considerably within sub-sectors.   7
3. The model 
We present a two-country, two-firm international oligopoly model.
19 Two 
groups of countries are considered: the first one consists of the cooperating nations that 
implement stricter mitigation measures (labelled country I ) and a second group is 
formed by the non-cooperating countries (henceforth country II).  The international   
oligopoly is formed by two firms (firm 1 and firm 2), which manufacture the same 
homogeneous good
20 in country I and II respectively.  Firm 1’s location strategy is 
endogenously determined by the model, while for simplicity firm 2’s international 
strategy is given, as this firm may only export to the foreign market.
21  
Let us assume that country I sets a more stringent regulation on pollution 
emissions as compared to country II, introducing a pollution tax  II I t t > , where   II t  
represents the common price of emissions in the two areas before the new measure is 
introduced.
22 Such policy may have different repercussions on firm 1’s location 
strategy. 
Firm 1’s location strategy space is given by  { } TR PR NR S , , 1 = . The firm 
chooses “no relocation” (NR), when it continues to produce in the home country and to 
serve the foreign market via export;
 23  in this case the tighter pollution tax has no 
impact on firm 1’s  location choice. If, on the contrary, there is a shift of production 
abroad, this may be either partial or total. There is  “partial relocation”  (PR) if the 
environmental measures stimulate the local firm to substitute export with foreign 
production, leading to a partial shift of production abroad. The firm will undertake a 
market-oriented FDI and have a plant in each country. There is “total relocation” (TR) if 
firm 1 moves all production abroad, and exports back to the home market. This is the 
case implicitly assumed in the pollution haven and carbon leakage debates.   
Equilibrium is determined by solving a two-stage game. In the first stage firm 1 
chooses its location strategy. In the second stage the two firms, competing à la Cournot, 
                                                 
19 For the monopoly case see Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini (2010), which does not present a welfare 
analysis. 
20 We did not consider intermediate products  since, as indicated by Bergmann et al. (2007),  p.1,  energy 
intensive sectors generally form part of  vertically integrated highly clustered value chains.  Hanle et al. 
(2004) ,  p.  7,  indicates that 93% of plants in the US cement industry are integrated facilities. See 
www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei13/ghg/hanle.pdf.   
21 Firm 2, for instance, may face prohibitive fixed FDI costs due to the lack of international experience. 
22 If many industries pollute and the firm considered is a price-taker in a competitive market for permits, 
the pollution tax is equivalent to the price of a permit per unit of output, and the analysis can be extended 
to an emission trading system. See Markusen et al. (1993) and Alexeeva –Talebi et al. (2008).  
23 We restrict the parameters range to values such that, after the introduction of   I t , it is still profitable for 
firm 1  to export, thus excluding the NE (no export) outcome in which firm 1 sells only in country I.   8
decide simultaneously how much to sell in each market (and therefore the level of 
output). 
We allow for asymmetry in the size of the two countries, differently from most 
previous studies.  A first attempt to address this issue was made by Motta and Thisse 
(1994), who analyze the effect of relative market size on location within very restrictive 
assumptions, considering only low transport costs, and disregarding  this issue in the 
welfare analysis. Zeng and Zhao (2009) instead consider market asymmetry within a  
monopolistic competition model which does  not allow for the export/FDI choice and, 
in case of FDI, for the choice between partial or total relocation.  
 
3.1 Assumptions of the model 
Before the introduction of the tighter pollution tax, firm 1 and firm 2 are based 
in country I and II respectively and export to the other country. Domestic and foreign 
inverse demand functions are assumed to be linear: 
  ) ( , 2 , 1 I I I I I q q b a P + − =                                                                                      (1) 
) ( , 2 , 1 II II II II II q q b a P + − =                                                                                    (2) 
where  K i q ,  denotes the output sold by firm i in country K (with  2 , 1 = i , K =I, II) and the 
parameters  K K b a ,  measure market size in country K. It follows that market size 
differences will be measured by  II I a versus a  and by  II I b versus b  . 
The two firms face the same production technology, which is characterized by a 
constant marginal cost c and by a fixed cost  K i G ,  (with  2 , 1 = i , K =I, II) necessary to 
install a manufacturing plant. For the sake of simplicity we label each firm’s home plant 
fixed cost as  h i G , , and the foreign plant fixed cost as  f i G , . There is also a fixed cost at 
the firm level (F), which captures firm-specific activities such as advertising, marketing, 
distribution and managerial services. Transport costs per unit of export are indicated by 
the parameter s, while the more stringent pollution tax in country I by  II I t t > . We focus 
on global industrial pollution
24 and assume that emissions are proportional to output. 
The emission coefficient is set equal to 1, so that the level of emissions is given by the 
volume of  production. 
 25   
                                                 
24 This is the case of pollution emitted locally that has global effects (like GHGs). 
25 This is line with the CO2 intensity of cement production reported by Bergmann et al. (2007),  p. 26 and 
p. 83.   9
Firm 1 may choose to serve the foreign market via export or FDI, while firm 2 is 
by assumption an exporter. Export implies additional marginal (and unit) transport 
cost
26 s  -with  II t s > - whilst FDI involves additional plant specific fixed costs  f G , 1  
(associated to the new plant in the foreign market).
27 Thus export is the high marginal 
cost and low fixed cost option, and the reverse is the case for FDI. When total relocation 
takes place, firm 1 will have to bear transport costs to transfer the goods produced in 
country II to the home market. 
Profits depend on the market configuration, which is influenced by firm 1’s 
location choice. In the NR outcome there is one plant in each country; in the PR case 
there are one plant in country I and two in country II as firm 1 invest abroad; in the TR 
case firm 1’s entire production is moved abroad, thus there is no plant in country I and 
two plants in country II.  The objective functions in the different scenarios are reported 
in Appendix I. 
 
3.2 Optimal profits   
With “no relocation”, which implies that firm 1 produces only in country I and 





II I I NR G F
b
t s t c a
b








+ − − −
+
+ + − −





I II I NR G F
b
s t t c a
b






) 2 2 (
ˆ − −
+ + − −
+
+ − − −
= π                 (4)          
                         
With “partial relocation”, that is if firm 1 chooses to serve the foreign market via 
local production opening a plant also in country II, we obtain that optimal profits are as 
follows:             








t s t c a






ˆ − − −
− −
+
+ + − −



















+ − − −
= π                                (6)
            
                                                 
26 The value of s may also capture other trade costs (see Anderson and Wincoop, 2004).   
27 This parameter also accounts for other additional fixed costs associated to FDI.    10
With “total relocation”, when firm 1 moves all production abroad and the home 
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4.  The impact of unilateral climate policy on market structure 
The impact of the introduction of a more stringent pollution tax in country I on 
the local firm’s location strategy will be assessed allowing for different degrees of 
asymmetry. Furthermore, we consider two cases, depending on the relative magnitude 
of transport costs (s) as compared to the differential between the pollution 
taxes ) ( II I t t − . Thus we define as “low transport costs” the case with  ) ( II I t t s − < , that 
is  when unit transport costs are lower than the additional environmental costs; on the 
contrary we call “high transport costs” the case with  ) ( II I t t s − > . 
 
4.1 Full symmetry ( a a a II I = = ,  b b b II I = = ,  h f G G , 1 , 1 = ,  h i G ,  not sunk) 
Let us assume that the two countries have the same size ( II I a a = ,  II I b b = ). In 
addition, firm 1’s fixed plant costs are equal in both markets, which implies that the 
fixed costs associated to the home plant are not sunk, i.e. that the existing capital stock 
has reached its economic end of life. Furthermore, this scenario requires that for firm 1 
there are no additional fixed costs to enter the foreign market, such as for instance costs 
due to language differences or costs of controlling production from a distance. 
Comparing Eqs. (3), (5), (7) we can state: 
Proposition I: With full symmetry a more stringent environmental tax imposed 
by country I ( II I t t >  ) will  lead to some form of relocation  (total or partial), except for 
extreme values of s.   
Proof:     Setting    c a A − = , we have that 
[] {}
2
1 1 ) ( 2 ) (
9
4 ˆ ˆ s s t A t t
b
I II I
NR TR − − − − = −π π                                                      (9)                              
With low transport costs Eq. (9) is always strictly positive since  s t t II I > − ) ( , and 
s s t A I > − − ) ( 2   because of  0 ˆ , 1 >
NR
II q .  Since, with s ≤  3 ) ( II I t t − , the term in curly   11
brackets in Eq. (9) is positive, in the high transport costs case a sufficient condition  for 
0 ˆ ˆ 1 1 > −
NR TR π π  is that  s ≤ 3 ) ( II I t t − , that is if we exclude extreme values of s.               
With symmetry in market size and plant costs, there is only one centripetal force 
(captured by the term 
2 s ) discouraging firm 1 to choose TR, which may be labelled as 
the “lower competition” effect. By choosing TR firm 1 would in fact forego the benefits 
due to the cost asymmetry it enjoys vis-à-vis the foreign exporter when serving the 
home market via local production.
28 With low transport costs this centripetal force is 
always insufficient to compensate for the effect of the more stringent pollution tax 
which, by rising unit variable costs, stimulates the local firm to move production 
abroad. This is also generally the case with high transport costs.  The “lower 
competition”  effect is obviously not present if we consider an international monopoly 
(see Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini, 2010). In other words additional centripetal forces 
discouraging relocation are at work when there is foreign competition. 
Furthermore, transport costs influence the characteristics of the process of 
relocation. We can state:  
Proposition II : With full symmetry and low transport costs (i.e.  ) ( II I t t s − < ) 
relocation is total, that is all production is moved abroad when country I enacts 
unilaterally a more stringent climate policy. Instead, with  high transport costs 
( ) ( II I t t s − > ) relocation may be total or partial. 
Proof: 
It is straightforward to show that  
[] h I II I
PR TR G t A t t s
b
, 1 1 1 ) ( ) (
9






⎧ − − − − = −π π                                                (10) 
Since 0 , 1 > h G , a sufficient condition for the expression in (10) to be strictly 
positive is that  ) ( II I t t s − < . On the other hand, with  ) ( II I t t s − >  the condition 
PR TR
1 1 ˆ ˆ π π >  may hold for sufficiently low values of  h G , 1 .                                     
With low transport costs, variable profits are higher with the TR than with the 
PR choice (the term in curly bracket is positive); this reinforces the effect of  h G , 1 , 
leading firm 1 to relocate all production abroad.  Such result  is in line with the 
                                                 
28 A shift from NR to TR implies that firm 1 looses the protection from transport costs previously enjoyed 
in the home market, but at the same time it removes the competitive disadvantage previously faced as 
compared to the local producer in country II. The lower competition effect seems to suggest that the first 
effect prevail on the second.   12
conclusions of previous studies,  assuming symmetric countries and zero transport costs 
(i.e. a special case of the low transport cost scenario), which found that unilateral 
climate actions lead to total relocation of domestic production. However, we show that 
with symmetric countries but high transport costs, the two forces in Eq. (10) (additional 
variable profits versus additional fixed costs) contrast each other and thus total 
relocation is not anymore inevitable, as partial relocation may instead take place.  
 
4.2  Market size asymmetry and  plant costs symmetry  ( II I a a > ,  II I b b < , 
h f G G , 1 , 1 = ,  h i G ,  not sunk) 
Let us introduce now market size asymmetry, with country I being larger than 
country II (i.e  II I a a > ,  II I b b < ). As before, firm 1 faces the same  plant fixed costs in 
both countries. We obtain that, if the more stringent environmental tax ( II I t t > ) is 
imposed by the large country ( II I a a > and  II I b b < ), the level of transport costs plays a  
crucial role  in determining whether or not market structure will change.  
We could show that: 
Proposition III With high transport costs ( ) ( II I t t s − > ), if the more stringent 
climate policy is imposed by the large country, the probability  that neither partial nor 
total relocation takes place increases in market asymmetry. 
Proof:  
Straightforward, as (given   c a A i i − = ) 
TR NR
1 1 ˆ ˆ π π >      iff    
0
) ( ) (
) (
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We may observe from Eq. (11) that no relocation will be chosen instead of total 
relocation if the two centripetal forces due to the “market asymmetry” effect  (first term 




) prevail on the centrifugal 
effect due to the environmental policy asymmetry (second term in curly brackets).  If 
both Eqs. (11) and (14) are satisfied, a more stringent pollution tax in the large country 
(country I) will not modify the local firm’s location strategy.  
When the size of the foreign market falls, being it measured by a decrease in  II a , 
and thus ceteris paribus the gap in market size becomes larger, the probability of 
choosing the no relocation strategy increases, as both condition (11) and (14) are 
decreasing in  II a  (see (12) and (15)). As to the influence of transport costs, we find that 
an increase in s, while decreasing the probability of total relocation due to Eq. (13), 
increases the likelihood of partial relocation due to Eq. (16). 
We may conclude that total relocation is a less likely outcome in sectors with 
high transport costs, when environmental policy is enacted by the large country 
( II I a a > ; II I b b < ). Even if  h G , 1  is not sunk, market asymmetry associated to high 
transport costs may explain why a unilateral increase in the stringency of environmental 
policy by the large country may not result in local firms moving abroad.
  When 
considering symmetry in plant costs, that is if the economic life of the home plant has 
reached termination, plant economies of scale (specifically the size of the foreign plant 
f G , 1 ) play a key role only in firm 1 choice between not changing location strategy and 
serving each market by local production (NR versus PR). With  f h G G , 1 , 1 = , plant 
economies of scale instead do not influence the choice between producing only at home 
and total relocation (NR versus TR).    14
On the other hand, with market asymmetry and low transport costs 
( ) ( II I t t s − < ), a more stringent pollution tax set by country I results in all production 
shifting abroad (total relocation), as in the case of market size symmetry.
29    
 
4.3   Plant costs asymmetry with market size symmetry ( h i f i G G , , > , 
a a a II I = = ; b b b II I = = ). 
We will focus on the case in which firms’ existing capital stock has not yet 
reached its economic end of life, i.e. domestic plant costs are sunk ( 0 , = h i G ).
30  The 
two markets are assumed instead to be symmetric.   
We find that: 
Proposition IV   If fixed plant costs are higher when investing abroad, no 
relocation may be the optimal strategy both with low and high transport costs, even in 
the case of two symmetric markets. 
Proof:  
It is straightforward to show that  
[] {}
2
, 1 1 1 ) ( 2 ) (
9
4 ˆ ˆ s s t A t t
b
G iff I II I f
TR NR − − − − > >π π                                  
and  
PR NR
1 1 ˆ ˆ π π >   if Eq. (14) holds.                                                                           
Higher fixed plant costs for a firm investing abroad, as in the case when 
domestic plant costs are sunk, represent a powerful centripetal force and thus should be 
taken into account when assessing the probability  that tighter mitigation measures 
unilaterally adopted will induce domestic firms to move production abroad. The key 
role of asymmetry in plant costs instead does not seem to be fully acknowledged in the 
“carbon leakage” debate currently undergoing in the EU. 
Moreover, we can restrict the set of feasible outcomes, ruling out the possibility 
that some forms of relocation may become an equilibrium location strategy. We find 
that: 
Proposition V  If fixed plant costs are higher when investing abroad, with low 
transport costs ( ) ( II I t t s − < ) partial relocation is never an optimal strategy, while with  
high transport costs ( ) ( II I t t s − > ) total relocation is never an optimal strategy. 
                                                 
29 A proof is available on request from the authors. 
30  The conclusions may be easily extended to  h f G G , 1 , 1 >  with  0 , > h i G .   15
Proof:  
It is easily found that  
[] ) ( ) (
9
4 ˆ ˆ 1 1 I II I
TR PR t c a t t s
b
− − − − = −π π                                                           (17)   
Thus    )) ( ( ) ˆ ˆ ( 1 1 II I
TR PR t t s sign sign − − = −π π                                                         
We then find that in the low transport costs scenario the only feasible outcomes 
are no relocation and total relocation, while in the high transport costs scenario the only 
feasible outcomes are no relocation and partial relocation. 
 
4.4   Market size and plant costs asymmetry ( II I a a > ,   II I b b < ,  h f G G , 1 , 1 >  or 
h i G ,  sunk). 
Let us consider both asymmetries jointly, and assume that at the same time 
country I is larger and that firm 1 faces higher fixed plant costs  in country II , such as 
when  the economic life of the home plant has not reached termination and thus the 
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We thus have three  centripetal forces (market asymmetry effect, lower competition 
effect and plant cost asymmetry effect) opposed to the centrifugal impact of the 
asymmetric climate policy on the firm’s location decision.  Thus the forces discouraging 
the firm from moving production abroad are stronger: in other words the range of 
parameters for which unilateral environmental policy will result in firms relocating 
production abroad is further reduced.  
The possible outcomes in terms of the firm’s location strategy are summarized in 
Table 1. It is shown that in two key scenarios, which capture crucial features of the 
present economic reality, total relocation can be ruled out as a feasible outcome, i.e. it is 
never an optimal location strategy.  In addition it emerges that no relocation is a feasible 
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Table 1 The impact of a unilateral pollution tax on the local firm’s location  












Note: R = relocation  
                          * = Not feasible if  ) ( 3 II I t t s − ≤  
 
5. Regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the short and long-run 
The previous analysis can be reinterpreted as indicating equilibrium outcomes in 
two different time frames: the short/medium-term in which the existing capital stock is 
still operating and thus domestic plant fixed costs are sunk  (plant cost asymmetry with 
0 , = h i G ), and the long-run in which a new plant should be established also in the 
domestic market, as the existing capital stock has reached its economic end of life (plant 
cost symmetry with  f i h i G G , , = ).
31 
                                                 
31 The differences in the impact of unilateral mitigation measures between the short/medium term and the 
long term is underlined by OECD (2009) and Bergmann  et al.  (2007).   
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In order to clarify the economic implications of our model, we will illustrate (see 
Fig.1) the possible short-run and long-run equilibrium outcomes, with and without 
unilateral mitigation policy, depicting them in the (s,  II a ) plane. These two parameters 
highlight the combined effect of transport costs (s) and market asymmetry ( II a ) on the 
equilibrium location choice. The boundaries of the different regions are defined by the 
values of the parameters that satisfy the conditions in Appendix II, obtained from the 
previous analysis.  
With a carbon tax equal to  II t  in both countries (i.e. in the baseline scenario) the 
equilibrium outcomes are the same in the short and long-run (Fig 1.a).  The boundaries 
between NR and PR are equal since  h G , 1   does not affect this curve (Eq.  (A.II.2) = Eq. 
(A.II.5)) and with symmetry in climate policy there is no centrifugal force sustaining a 
TR equilibrium (see Eq.(18)). This shows that in our model the asymmetry in climate 
policy is the only driver promoting the TR choice, while it is only one of the factors 
inducing the firm to choose PR, which is also motivated by the saving of trade costs (as 
shown by Eq. (14)). The effects of unilateral mitigation measures however differ 
according to the time horizon considered.  
In the short-run, for most parameter values, the adoption by the large country of 
unilateral environmental measures does not lead to a change in the location choice of 
domestic firms, when considering  industries characterized by high capital intensity 
(such as the pollution intensive sectors) (see Fig. 1.b).
32 With very high transport costs 
and a large size of the foreign market we may have a shift to PR (see shaded area in Fig. 
1.b), with firm 1 serving each market by local production.  To summarize, after the 
introduction of   II I t t >  , in the short/medium-run NR is the most likely outcome. If a 
change in location strategy takes place it will be a shift not to TR but to PR, which 
however requires extreme values of  s and  II a . 
The effect of unilateral climate policy in the long-run (Fig. 1.c) presents some 
major dissimilarities.  The main difference is that TR becomes a feasible outcome for a 
large  set of  parameters. If we are in the low transport cost scenario ( ) ( II I t t s − < ),
33  TR 
 
                                                 
32  By restricting the parameter range to values such that  0 ˆ , 1 >
NR
II q ,  we are ignoring  the increase in the 
NE (no export) region.  
33 That is below the horizontal line which indicates  ) ( II I t t s − = .   18
Figure 1: The effect of unilateral environmental policy on the equilibrium outcome 













                                      
 
1.a  Baseline scenario ( 15 15 , 0 ; 5 . 0 , , , , = = = = = = f i h i f i h i II I G G or G G either t t ) 
1.b  Short /medium-term scenario (1 5 , 0 ; 5 . 1 , , = = = f i h i I G G t ) 
1.c  Long-term scenario (1 5 ; 5 . 1 , , = = = f i h i I G G t ) 
Note: NE=no export; NR=no relocation; PR= partial relocation; TR= total relocation   19
will always be the equilibrium outcome (see also Tab. 1, with plant symmetry).  In the 
high transport cost case ( ) ( II I t t s − > ), all three outcomes are feasible, and Fig. 1.c 
helps us in identifying under which conditions each outcome is most likely.  We may 
note that market asymmetry plays a major role in determining the equilibrium location 
choice, with a large market asymmetry pushing towards the NR equilibrium also in the 
long-run (as suggested by Prop. III).  
Furthermore, ceteris paribus, there is no additional incentive to shift to PR in the 
long-run as compared to the short/medium-term (the PR boundary shifts of an equal 
amount in Fig. 1.b and 1.c).  However as country II size increases overtime,  PR will 
become a more likely outcome for reasons independent  from the unilateral carbon tax.  
 
6.  The impact of unilateral climate policy on welfare 
Country I welfare (
n
I W ˆ ), after the imposition of the more stringent carbon tax,  is 
defined as  the sum of  consumers surplus (
n
I S Cˆ ), domestic firm’s global profits (
n
1 ˆ π ),
34  
government revenue generated by the pollution tax (
n
I T ˆ ) and the environmental damage 
(
n D ˆ ) which is strictly convex in world production,
35 with n ∈ {NR,PR,TR}.  Welfare 
in the baseline scenario (in which II t  is the common price of emissions in both areas and 
both firms are exporting from their respective home market) is denoted by  I W
~
. The 
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π − + + =                                                                      (19) 
The impact of an unilateral climate policy on the country adopting the measures 
(country I) is evaluated by comparing welfare after and before the introduction of the 
stricter carbon tax, that is  )
~ ˆ ( I
n
I W W − . This variation captures both the effect of a rise in 
country I’s pollution tax and, if that is the case, of a change in the market structure due 
to a strategy shift.  Fig. 1 allows us to identify in which settings each of the three 
equilibrium outcomes are likely to prevail, both in the short and in the long-run.  The 
emission leakage, i.e. the environmental effectiveness of the unilateral mitigation 
measures, is here assessed in terms of the impact of the policy on world production and 
                                                 
34 It is assumed that foreign profits are fully repatriated. 
35 The emission coefficient is set equal to 1, see p. 10.   20
thus on the global level of emissions.
36 The job leakage, which is not explicitly 
considered in the welfare function, is indirectly captured by  the change in the carbon 
tax revenue, as both phenomena depend on the fall in the domestic production level. 
 
6.1  The NR equilibrium outcome 
With the adoption of unilateral environmental measures in country I, no change 
in the location strategy of local firms is the most likely outcome in the short-medium  
run in the case of capital intensive sectors (see Fig. 1), and may also be the equilibrium 
outcome in the long-run with a large market asymmetry and high transport costs. 
The unilateral mitigation measure, when firm 1 location strategy does not 
change, leads to a fall in world production and thus emissions, although part of the 
contraction in domestic production is compensated by a rise in foreign output.
37 In fact 























Q Q                                                             (20) 
In this scenario, the impact of the unilateral policy on consumers’ aggregate 
welfare is positive. Consumers’ aggregate welfare (see Cole et al., 2009,  p. 1242) is 
given by the sum of consumers’ surplus and pollution tax revenues, less the damage 
from pollution.  Here we assume that the revenue of the pollution tax  is 100% returned 
to the taxpayers.
38  Although consumers’ surplus narrowly defined falls,  for sufficiently 
low values of   II t , the carbon tax revenue increase is greater than the fall in consumers’ 
surplus, since under rather general conditions (see Appendix III): 
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Furthermore, pollution damage decreases since (see Appendix III):  
                                                 
36 As the measure of carbon leakage  suggested by IPCC (2007) (see note 2) is not easily quantifiable in 
the PR and TR cases,  we adopted a simpler indicator –the impact on world emissions-  which likewise 
accounts for the variation of emissions in both markets.  
37 The rise in foreign production is equal to half the fall in domestic output. 
38 World Bank (2008) p.110 indicates that national policies in this regard differ. Revenue from the 
German ecotax are almost fully returned to taxpayers while Danish carbon tax revenues from industry are 
entirely recycled in that sector.  On revenue recycling, see also Bergmann et al. (2007), p. 80,  OECD 
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The local firm’s profits instead diminish in both markets, as  
0
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The previous results allow us to state that: 
 
Proposition VI The introduction of   II I t t > , when firm 1 location strategy does 
not change, leads to a fall in world emissions, a rise in consumers’ aggregate welfare in 
country I, and a decrease in the local firm’s global profits.  
 
As to the overall effect on country I welfare,
39 if we consider only one source of 
market asymmetry ( II I a a >  while   b b b II I = = ), we obtain:  
 
0 )
~ ˆ ( > − I
NR
I W W   iff 
) 4 9 7 2 6 ( ) 4 6 2 4 4 ( 2 s t t A A b s t t A A II I II I II I II I I − + + + > − − − + γ                  (24) 
 
 where  I γ  represents the society’s assessment of the disutility of pollution.  As the LHS 
term in parenthesis in Eq. (24) is smaller than the RHS term in parenthesis,  b I > γ 2   is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for a net positive impact on welfare.  If       
0 = I γ ,   the overall impact is negative, that is the negative effect on firms prevail on 
the positive effect on consumers.  
To summarize, an unilateral climate policy, when it does not induce a change in 
location strategy, may rise the welfare of the country implementing it by leading to a 
fall in global emissions and rising consumers aggregate welfare, although the local 
firm’s profits decrease. This is the case also in the absence of technological innovation 
(not contemplated in our model) which would make condition (24) less restrictive. A  
positive net impact on welfare of the unilateral mitigation policy requires that a high 
                                                 
39 The full expression of the change in welfare is reported in Appendix III.    22
importance is  assigned by the national community to the environmental damage (i.e. 
that the value of  I γ  is high).   
 
6.2   The PR equilibrium outcome 
Figures 1b and 1c show that a shift to partial relocation is possible only if we are 
in the high transport cost scenario (thus  ) ( II I t t s − > ) and the size of the foreign market 
is large and thus market asymmetry is limited.  It also requires that the foreign plant 
fixed costs are not too high. 
If unilateral measures lead to partial relocation of domestic production,  global 
emissions may rise as the fall in domestic production may be more than compensated by 
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, which is not too 
restrictive as PR requires moderate market asymmetry.
40  By comparing Eq.s (20) and 
(25) we find that the emission leakage is always greater with PR than with NR. 
The sign of the impact on consumers’ aggregate welfare is undetermined.  The 
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which for  0 = II t  is positive, although lower than in the no strategy shift case.  
However, as world production may increase, and thus pollution damage may  
grow,  we cannot say what will be the overall impact on consumer aggregate welfare. 
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40 With  b b b II I = = , as we are in the high transport cost scenario, global emissions will certainly rise. 
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which, with  b b b II I = = , is positive as under this assumption overall emissions 
increase.  
Firm 1 profits fall in the domestic market but rise abroad, furthermore the firm 
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As to the overall welfare impact, assuming  b b b II I = =  and  0 = II t  we have: 
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Therefore the sufficient condition for a fall in welfare  becomes: 
[] [ ] 0 ) 3 4 4 )( ( ) ( 8 ) 2 ( 3 > − − + − + − − + s t A A t s s A s t A t b I II I I I II I I I γ                (30) 
As expected, a high value of   I γ   enhances the negative effect on welfare (since 
with  b b b II I = =  world pollution increases). 
To summarize, an unilateral environmental policy shifting the equilibrium to PR  
may lead to higher global emissions. It is thus possible that, when transport costs are 
very high and the market asymmetry is limited, an unilateral carbon tax may fail to 
achieve its primary task.  In addition, the carbon tax revenue is also limited, as now 
production in country I is aimed only to serve the local market, thus the sign of 
consumer aggregate welfare is undetermined.   The model shows that, contrary to what 
generally stated,
41 transport costs may rise the probability of carbon leakage. Although 
transport costs favour domestic production to serve the home market, they may also 
encourage the domestic producer to supply the foreign market via FDI instead of export, 
thus possibly leading to a high degree of carbon leakage. 
 
6.3  The TR equilibrium outcome 
Figures 1.b and 1.c show that total relocation of production abroad is an unlikely 
outcome in the short-term, while in the long-term this is the outcome for any degree of 
market asymmetry if we have low transport costs.  
                                                 
41 IPCC (2007) chapter 11, p.666 states that transport costs favour local production and thus decrease the 
probability of carbon leakage.   24
When the equilibrium shifts to TR, global emissions decrease as world 
production falls.
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Consumer aggregate welfare is likely to fall. As all production is moved abroad, 
the change in carbon tax revenue is negative.
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Thus, if we  consider  b b b II I = = , then 0 )
~ ˆ ( = − I
TR
I D D  and consumers’ 
aggregate welfare will certainly decrease, given Eq. (32).   
Variable profits due to domestic sales fall more than the increase in variable 
profits due to foreign sales, and furthermore there may be an increase in fixed costs. We 
have: 
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The overall effect on welfare, when  b b b II I = =  and thus  0 )
~ ˆ ( = − I
TR
I D D ,  is 
equal to:   
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Motta and Thisse (1994) found that  welfare could increase with the introduction 
of an unilateral carbon tax leading to TR, in contrast with our findings. However their 
model differs from ours in various respects. Firstly, they consider local instead of global 
pollution. In our model, damage (which is related to global output) either does not 
                                                 
42 If we consider only one source of market asymmetry, setting  II I b b = , the level of world production 
does not change.    25
decrease (when considering   b b b II I = = ) or decreases less than in the local pollution 
case.  Furthermore in their analysis, before  I t  is introduced, there is no price of 
emissions in country I, and thus when production shifts abroad, there is no loss of 
carbon tax revenue. That too implies a more positive effect on country I welfare. 
To summarize, an unilateral environmental policy, when it does induce a shift of 
equilibrium to total relocation, may have some effect in containing global emissions. 
Furthermore carbon revenue falls substantially as all domestic production is moved 
abroad, and as a consequence consumers’ aggregate welfare shrinks. Thus the net effect 
on welfare is likely to be negative. This is the worst scenario in terms of the job leakage 
as all production will be undertaken in the foreign market. 
 
7. Implications as to carbon leakage provisions in EU and US climate 
policies 
The design of climate policy both in the US and EU has been heavily influenced 
by fears of emission and job leakage, as this has become a major political issue across 
the Atlantic.  In both cases special provisions have been introduced in favour of sectors 
identified as vulnerable. 
US legislation on climate change policy is still under examination. The 
American Clean Energy and Security Act known as the Waxman-Markey Bill,  was 
approved by the House of Representatives in June 2009 (HR 2454), and the Kerry-
Lieberman American Power Act has been presented at the Senate in May 2010.  The 
Waxman-Markey Bill
43 establishes quantitative criteria for identifying which 
manufacturing industries are “energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE)”, thus 
presumably eligible for special provisions. They  are:  1) energy intensity (or carbon 
intensity) is at least 5 percent and trade intensity is at least 15 percent
44 or  2) energy 
intensity (or carbon intensity) is at least 20 percent, regardless of the trade intensity. 
45 
Two sets of provisions to moderate competitiveness and leakage impacts are 
considered. To start with, free emission allowances will be allocated  (or allowance 
rebates provided) to  EITE  sectors, by using a continuously updating output-based 
                                                 
43  As the Kerry-Lieberman Bill is still a draft, we will focus on  HR 2454.  
44 See US EPA (2009), p. 8, for the definition of  industry’s energy intensity etc.. 
45  Out of the  nearly 500  six-digit manufacturing industries considered, 44 would be identified as EITE 
under H.R. 2454 (see US EPA, 2009, pp. 2, 9.).    26
formula
46  (thus considering current production) (see US EPA, 2009, p. 30).  This 
measure is guaranteed up to 2025 and will be  phased out by 2035.  The other provision 
consists in “border tax adjustments”, i.e. border taxes on carbon intensive imports from 
countries without comparable climate policy starting in 2020 (see  US EPA, 2009, p. 30; 
Carbon Trust, 2009; Dröge, 2009). 
A broader set of criteria have been adopted by the EU Directive 2009/29/EC
47 to 
identify sectors “deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage”.  They 
are: 1) additional CO2 costs  as a proportion of gross value added of at least 5% and 
trade intensity with third countries exceeding 10%; or 2) additional CO2 costs  as a 
proportion of gross value added of at least 30%  regardless of trade intensity;  or 3) 
trade intensity with third countries exceeding 30% regardless of carbon intensity. The 
third criterion considerably enlarges the range of sectors included. Out of 258 
manufacturing sectors  examined at the 4-digit NACE level, 147 were found to be at 
significant risk of carbon leakage (117 of which due to  the trade intensity criterion).
48   
The sectors at risk of carbon leakage are estimated to account for around 77% of the 
total emissions from manufacturing industry in the EU ETS,  while EITE account for 
almost half of US manufacturing GHG emissions.
49  
The EU Directive provides that installations in vulnerable sectors shall receive 
100% of  allowances free, through an allocation system based on ex-ante product-
specific benchmarks.
50  An installation will thus receive a fixed free amount of 
allowances, depending on the relevant benchmark and its historical production level. 
Each benchmark is calculated by considering the average performance of the 10% most 
efficient installations in the Community that produce the given product, to ensure that 
producers have a strong incentive to reduce emissions.
51.  This provision is 
complemented by plant closure rules (with withdrawn allowances if a facility cease or 
                                                 
46 In each year, rebates for direct emissions would be calculated by multiplying an eligible entity’s 
average output in the two prior years by the average direct GHG emission intensity of the sector. See US 
EPA (2009), p.30.  
47 The 2009 Directive revised the initial EU ETS 2003 Directive. 
48 Bergman, H. (2009), ‘Sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage –outcome of 
the assessment’ DG Environment C2, European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/wg3_16_sep_presentation.pdf  
49 The list of carbon leakage sectors was notified by the Commission in December 2009. The assessment 
was performed at the NACE 4-digit level, considering an average carbon price of  €30 per ton of CO2, as 
indicated in the Directive. See FAQ in  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm 
(carbon leakage). For the US figure see EPA (2009),  p. 2.  
50 The Commission will determine the benchmarks by 31 December 2010.  
51 The free allowances cover the full direct costs, but not the indirect costs which may however be 
compensated by each relevant Member State (art 10a(6)).   27
partially cease operations). Furthermore, a new entrant or an  installation undertaking 
“significant extension of activity” will also receive free allowances.  The Directive has 
not ruled out the possibility of imposing border tax adjustments.
52    
The attempt to moderate the competitiveness-driven job leakage has influenced 
the allocation rules in the Waxman-Markey Bill even more than in the EU Directive, at 
the cost of creating a less cost-efficient cap and trade system.  The US proposed 
allocation mode amounts to an output subsidy which decreases the marginal (and unit 
variable) cost of US production, thus  lowering the incentive to both partial and total 
relocation. However this system “will not allow the full CO2 price signal to diffuse 
through product prices” (Reinaud, 2008, p. 84) as firms are not confronted with an 
opportunity cost for the permits. If a firm reduces production it does not enjoy extra 
permits to sell into the market; it will instead receive a smaller amount of 
allowances/rebates since these are linked to current output. The US system thus 
hampers demand reduction of CO2 intensive products and possibly innovation.
 On the 
contrary the approach adopted by the EU, by  fixing before the trading period the 
amount of free allowances allocated, creates an opportunity costs for the permits and 
thus introduces a visible CO2 price signal. Fixed free allocations represent a lump sum 
transfer to producers and, when complemented by new entrant reserve and closure rules, 
may affect firms’ location decisions.  The EU  system can thus be seen as leading to an 
increase in the fixed cost of  relocation, since by shifting production abroad firms 
renounce to a lump sum transfer. We saw (Eq.s (14), (18)) that the relocation of 
production decision is influenced also by fixed costs considerations.   
As to border tax adjustment on imports, which plays an important role in the US 
but not in the EU legislation,  our model suggests an additional reason for such measure 
not to be adopted.  An import tax does not affect the incentive to partially relocate 
production, which emerges as the most likely location strategy shift induced by 
unilateral climate policy. This is the case since, with partial relocation, the domestic 
producers continue to serve the national market from the home plant.  A large number 
of other important economic problems discouraging the adoption of a border tax 
adjustments on imports have been discussed in the literature, such as the risk of trade 
disruption due to trade retaliation, difficulties in defining which category of products 
                                                 
52 Art 10b of  EU Directive 2009/29/EC establishes  that by 30 June 2010 the Commission should submit 
a report suggesting appropriate proposals for sectors at risk of carbon leakage which may include free 
allowances and border carbon taxes.    28
within a given sector to select and in measuring and monitoring,  potentially large 
administrative costs , etc. (OECD, 2009, p. 37 ).   
To sum up, climate policy in both regions has been heavily shaped by 
competitiveness-driven carbon leakage considerations, due to strong pressures from 
industry groups.  The EU allocation mode seems to strike a better balance between the 
aim of moderating relocation-driven carbon leakage and the cost-effectiveness of the 
policy. On the other hand, the EU criteria for identifying vulnerable sectors are certainly 
not restrictive enough, and much broader than in the US case.  
 
8. Conclusions and future research  
The aim of the paper is to show that the FDI perspective may contribute to the 
pollution haven and “carbon leakage” debates, calling attention on how plant fixed costs 
and transport costs, interacting with relative market size, affect the probability of shifts 
in local firms’ international location strategy, when a country (or a group of countries) 
adopts unilateral mitigation measures.   
It is shown that the fear of  total production relocation is highly exaggerated in 
the pollution haven and “carbon leakage” literature and in the public debate, at least 
when considering the short/medium-run, that is when domestic plant costs are sunk. 
This does not always represent a narrow time span, as the economic life of plants in 
pollution-intensive sectors may extend to over 30 years.
53 When domestic plant costs 
are sunk, total relocation cannot be an optimal strategy in the high transport costs 
scenario, which is the most plausible case for pollution-intensive sectors. Furthermore, 
numerical simulations tend to exclude the possibility of a total relocation equilibrium 
also in the case of low transport costs. If the home plant fixed costs are not sunk (which 
may represent the long-term), a pronounced market asymmetry associated to high 
transport costs may explain why an unilateral increase in the stringency of 
environmental policy by the larger area may not result in local firms moving all 
production abroad. However if the asymmetry in environmental policy is expected to 
persist over the long run and the cooperating area does not enjoy a large size advantage 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world,  total relocation may become an equilibrium outcome 
also with high transport costs. Nevertheless, this outcome would require stable 
                                                 
53 See footnote 16.   29
expectations as to the regulatory regime and future market conditions, which is not a 
likely scenario in the present context of climate policy uncertainty.  
In the short/medium-term, if there is a location strategy shift, this will take the 
form of partial relocation of production. That is, firms from the region with the more 
stringent environmental measures may start producing also abroad, instead of serving 
the foreign market via export. We found that, with partial relocation, the global level of 
pollution may rise, depending on the extent of the market asymmetry, and thus 
unilateral environmental policy may fail to achieve its primary aim.  Nevertheless, we 
should consider that the main driver of the decision to produce also in other major areas 
is represented by the fast growth of foreign markets.
54 Therefore, the stricter pollution 
measures are likely to accelerate a decision which would be taken in any case later on.  
The model shows that, contrary to expectations, transport costs may induce carbon 
leakage, by favouring partial relocation of production. 
As to the welfare impact, an unilateral environmental policy not leading to a 
change in location strategy may rise welfare, by bringing about a fall in global 
emissions and rising consumers’ aggregate welfare, although local firms’ profits 
decrease. In order to have a positive net effect, a public opinion seriously interested in 
the solution of the environmental problem, and thus assigning great importance to a fall 
in pollution damage, is required. On the other hand, the net effect on welfare of 
unilateral measures is likely to be negative when the policy leads to partial or total 
relocation. Thus, the temporal dimension of the asymmetry in environmental policy (i.e. 
if it is a structural or transient scenario as other countries will follow) and the relative 
size of the cooperating area emerge as critical factors influencing the possibility to 
implement successfully more restrictive environmental measures. 
The attempt to moderate the risk of relocation-driven carbon leakage is indicated 
as a major objective of both EU and US climate policy. We found however that some of 
the measures considered do not create  the right incentives as they are designed to deter 
total relocation of production but not partial relocation, which instead emerged as the 
most likely location strategy shift induced by unilateral climate policy. For instance the 
“border tax adjustments” on carbon intensive imports, proposed by the US Waxman-
Markey Bill and considered also by the European Directive, may be effective when 
                                                 
54 The Financial Times, December 30 2009, p. 15 “Cement makers seek to spread risk”, indicates that  the 
shift of growth from mature to emerging construction markets is a key reason why both Lafarge and 
Holcim have both sought to begin producing also in China.   30
firms plan to relocate all production abroad and serve the home market from the foreign 
plant, but would  not create any centripetal incentive if firms plan to serve each market 
via local production. Alternative measures should be designed, aimed on one hand to 
reduce the incentive to produce in both areas and on the other to limit the possible 
negative impact of a location strategy shift on the global level of emissions. 
 In order to address this important issue,  it is necessary to enrich the analysis by 
accounting for technological differences between countries, which implies that   
emission coefficients vary across regions. The assumption of  technological similarity 
across countries and firms is a limit of our analysis, leading us to overestimate the 
negative impact on global pollution due to a location strategy shift. Our next step will 
be to extend the model by considering technological asymmetries between firms 
operating in different areas and the role of multinational companies in the international 
transfer of green technologies.    31
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In fact, if  0 = II t , the second term in square brackets is positive since 
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III.2  As to pollution damage: 
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